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THE POTENTIAL AND RISKS OF RELYING ON
TITLE II'S INTEGRATION MANDATE TO CLOSE
SEGREGATED INSTITUTIONS
Steven Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
When President George Bush signed the Americans with
Disabilities Act on July 26, 1990, some believed that it would
mandate the end of segregated institutions for persons with
disabilities. But only nine years later, when the Supreme Court
interpreted the integration mandate of the ADA, it crushed those
hopes with language explicitly recognizing an appropriate role for
such institutions in a publicly-funded service system.' A reactionary
voice seized this statement and attempted to interpret it as a mandate
to maintain all existing institutions. This parabolic evolution has left
advocates from each end of the spectrum with a rather unconvincing
claim that the integration mandate is relevant at all to the closure or
maintenance of segregated facilities.
But a more nuanced argument may be crafted from the history,
language, and pragmatic application of Title II's integration mandate.
That argument depends on either an incremental approach to closure,
or a skillful blend of administrative, legislative, and media advocacy
to forge a determination to enforce the fundamental promise of the
ADA.
* Executive Director, Center for Public Representation, with grateful assistance from LeElle
Krompass, J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1999).
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I. THE MISPERCEIVED PROMISE OF TITLE II'S
INTEGRATION MANDATE
2
Scholars claimed and advocates hoped that Title II's integration
mandate would end the sordid history of segregation, and particularly
its most visible vestige, institutions for persons with psychiatric,
intellectual, and developmental disabilities. That claim was grounded
in the legislative history and Congressional Findings of the ADA.
During the late 19th century and early 20th century, discrimination
against persons with mental disabilities was the norm. Society
accepted the pseudoscientific literature on the topic and, in
conjunction with the new "science" of eugenics and the emergence of
Social Darwinism, believed that the "feeble minded" were a "menace
to society and civilization... responsible for many, if not all, of our
social problems." 3 Segregation of such individuals was justified on
the grounds that it was beneficial for both the community and the
persons with mental disabilities themselves.4 Virtually every state
institutionalized persons with disabilities, especially children,
claiming that they were unsuitable for companionship, a blight on
mankind, and whose mingling with society was a most baneful evil. 5
Justice Marshall lamented that:
A regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation soon
emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed
paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive custodial
institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the aim
was to halt reproduction of the retarded and nearly extinguish
their race. Retarded children were categorically excluded from
2. Much of this history, the import of the Findings, and the chronicle of segregation that animated
the ADA is drawn from the many amici briefs filed in support of the Respondents in Olmstead.
3. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
4. See, e.g., C.S. Yoakum, Care of the Feeble-minded in Insane in Texas, BULL. U. TEX. 83 (Nov.
5, 1914) (describing the institutionalization and segregation of persons with disabilities as "consistent
with a deep and abiding charity [that] ... permits all to live under those circumstances best suited to
make each useful and happy").
5. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMPLE L.
REv. 393, 400-01 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 26:3
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TITLE W'S INTEGRATION MANDATE
public schools, based on the false stereotype that all were
ineducable and on the purported need to protect nonretarded
children from them. State laws deemed the retarded unfit for
citizenship.6
A radical change occurred in the decades that followed the end of
racial segregation, a form of segregation that also was justified on the
theory that the practice was beneficial for everyone involved. Rather
than segregate persons with disabilities, professionals argued that
"normalization"--living as part of a community, not outside it-was
more respectful, more dignified, and more integrated for individuals
with disabilities.7 Congress affirmed the shift of opinion among the
professional community by passing the ADA, an attempt to officially
erase the effects of the country's history of segregation and to chart a
new, more humane course:
Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements,
such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem .... [T]he
Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
[should include] assuring... independent living... for such
individuals.8
The legislative history of the ADA makes it unmistakably clear
that Congress intended to end the segregation of persons with
disabilities.9 Upon introducing the bill, the House Committee on
6. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
7. See, e.g., Bengt Nire, The Normalization Principle and Its Human Management Implications, in
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES
FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 179, 186-87 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger eds., 1969).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(8) (2006).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111) (Judiciary Comm.), at 26 (1990) ("The Americans with
Disabilities Act completes the circle begun in 1973 with respect to persons with disabilities by extending
to them the same civil rights protections provided to women and minorities beginning in 1964. This
year, 1990, is an historic one in the evolution of this nation's public policy towards persons with
20101
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Education and Labor found that "[t]here is a compelling need to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination and for the integration of persons with
disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American
life."' 10 The Senate report accompanying the ADA relied heavily on a
1983 report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights entitled
Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities," which noted
that "segregation singles out handicapped people and separates them
from the rest of society, frequently as a condition for receiving some
service or benefit," and that "mental health and mental retardation
institutions that house residents in almost complete isolation from the
non-handicapped community are perhaps archetypal examples of
segregation."1 2 Further, Senator Harkin, floor manager of the Senate
debates and prime sponsor of the legislation, remarked as he closed
debate in the Senate that:
Today, Congress opens the door to all Americans with
disabilities .... [T]oday we say no to fear ... [W]e say no to
ignorance, and... we say no to prejudice. The ADA is, indeed,
the 20 h century Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with
disabilities. Today, the U.S. Senate will say to all Americans that
the days of segregation and inequality are over.1
3
The ADA directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations
to enforce the Act. 14 Section 12182(b)(1)(B), entitled "Integrated
Settings," requires that "[g]oods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual
with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
disabilities. The ADA is a comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation which promises a new future; a
future of inclusion and integration, and the end of exclusion and segregation.").
10. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(11) (Educ. & Labor Comm.), at 50. (1990).
11. S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (Aug. 30, 1989) ("[H]istorically, individuals with
disabilities have been isolated and subjected to discrimination and such isolation and discrimination is
still pervasive in our society.").
12. S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 98TH CONG., ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL
ABILITIES 41 (Comm. Print 1983).
13. 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03, at 9688 (Jul. 13, 1990).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2006).
[Vol. 26:3
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TITLE II'S INTEGRATION MANDATE
needs of the individual."'15 The Act defines "discrimination" as
"segregating... in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or
status of [a person] because of... disability."'16
The Attorney General's Title II "integration regulation" provides
that "a public entity shall administer services, programs and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities."'17 The Attorney General's comments to
this regulation identify integrated settings as those "that enable
individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to
the fullest extent possible."' 18 The Department of Justice further
explained its interpretation of the integration regulation as:
[Applying] to all services administered by a public entity,
including those that are offered exclusively to persons with
disabilities. The Attorney General therefore interprets the
regulation to require a State to provide services to persons with
disabilities in a community setting, rather than in an institution,
when a State's treatment professionals have determined, in the
exercise of reasoned professional judgment, that community
placement of the individual is appropriate. Because that
interpretation accords with the text of the regulation, it is entitled
to controlling weight.' 9
To prevent segregation, states are
required to provide care in integrated environments for as many
disabled persons as is reasonably feasible, so long as such an
environment is appropriate to their mental-health needs .... This
requirement serves as one of the principal purposes of Title II of
the ADA: ending the isolation and segregation of disabled
15. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(B).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bXl) (2006).
17. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1991).
18. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 478 (1991).
19. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1991) (No. 98-536), 1999 WL 149653.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 859 2009-2010
]  ' I TION NDATE 859 
s f  i ,,15  t fi es iscri ination"  
"segregating ... in a way that adversely affects t  rt ities r 
t t s  rs ] se of ... disability.,,16 
 tt r ey r l's tl  I r tion l tion" r ides 
t t a i  t  l i i t r , r s  ti ities 
 t r t  tti  ri te t  s f lifie  
l  it  .,,17 tt r  r l's e ts  
i   t rated tti s  t l  
i ls i ilities  r t  is led   
t t ,,18  t t  ti   
 t ti   ti  l ti   
l i ] i s i t re   , 
l i     r  i l   
iti .   
i      
iliti s  r , 
  t i ls  
i   it  
t  l   
 ,  
lli  1  
  
  
 
 t  ..   
 
 
[d.  
s. 1)  ( ). 
. . . t. t  ( ). 
for t it  tates ic  rti  , l t  . . .  rei. 
. . 581 ( ) ( . 199 1  
5
Schwartz: The Potential Risks of Relying on Title II's Integration Mandate
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
persons ... ,,20 This responsibility is referred to as the ADA's
"integration mandate."
Based upon the legislative history of the ADA, the text of the Act,
and the Department of Justice's own interpretation of the Act when
promulgating the accompanying regulations, it is easy to see why
persons with disabilities and their advocates perceived the integration
regulation to be an integration mandate for the closing of all
institutions. The Supreme Court, however, did not consider the issue
to be so clear.
II. THE OLMSTEAD AWAKENING
The Supreme Court interpreted and applied the integration
mandate in the landmark case of Olmstead v. L. C. Perhaps the most
quoted language of Olmstead, and its core message, is Justice
Ginsburg's statement that "Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly
regarded as discrimination based on disability." 21 That statement, and
its explication of discrimination, 22 affirms the fundamental import of
the integration mandate-that persons who can live safely in the
community have a right to do so, and that states currently
institutionalizing such persons have a federal obligation to
accommodate them in their community service systems. The
ineluctable result of these coterminous rights and duties is that many,
if not most, segregated institutions must close.
20. Arc of Washington State Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 617, 618 (9th Cir. 2005).
21. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at597.
22. The Court, after noting that "Congress explicitly identified unjustified 'segregation' of persons
with disabilities as a 'form of discrimination,"' explained the reason that such segregation is
discriminatory:
Recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of
discrimination reflects two evident judgments. First, institutional placement of persons
who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted
assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life. [citations omitted]. Second, confinement in an institution severely
diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural
enrichment.
Id. at 600-01.
[Vol. 26:3
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TITLE W'S INTEGRATION MANDATE
But, possibly in an attempt to balance ideological perspectives and
secure a majority of the Court, Justice Ginsburg went on to qualify
her sweeping definition of discrimination with perhaps the second
most quoted phrase: "Nothing in the ADA or its implementing
regulations condones termination of institutional settings for persons
unable to handle or benefit from community settings." 23 Citing the
amici curiae briefs of the American Psychiatric Association and the
Voice of the Retarded, the Court relied on the very stereotypes that it
chastised and endorsed institutionalization, at least for some persons:
"[T]he ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to phase out
institutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk . . . . For
other individuals, no placement outside the institution may ever be
appropriate.' '2 4 The unavoidable result of these qualifications is that
segregated institutions need not close.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence was even more pointed, saying that
Congress's "findings do not show that segregation and
institutionalization are always discriminatory or that segregation or
institutionalization are, by their nature, forms of prohibited
discrimination. ' '25 He, like Justice Breyer, adopted the historical
analysis of deinstitutionalization proffered by E. Fuller Torrey.26 But
that clarion cry against heedlessly deinstitutionalizing vulnerable
citizens was tempered by a striking "deference to the program
funding decisions of state policymakers."
27
Thus, although Olmstead adhered closely to the anti-segregationist
principles that underlie the ADA and its Congressional findings, and
although the Court's opinion is unique in equating institutionalization
23. Id. at 601-02. Earlier the Court used much more tempered and ambiguous language in its
contorted attempt to apply the reasonable modification regulation to the integration mandate: "But we
recognize, as well, the State's need to maintain a range of facilities for the care and treatment of persons
with diverse mental disabilities and the State's obligation to administer services with an even hand." Id.
at 599.
24. Id. at 604-05.
25. Id. at 614.
26. Id. at 610; see Torrey E. Fuller, ASYLUM IN THE COMMUNITY (1996).
27. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 610. Justice Kennedy also explained that "(g]rave constitutional concerns
are raised when a federal court is given the authority to review the State's choices in basic matters such
as establishing or declining to establish new programs. It is not reasonable to read the ADA to permit
court intervention in these decisions." Id. at 612-13.
20101
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with segregation, Olmstead is of limited utility to support the logical
consequence of its principled position: that segregated facilities are
unlawful and most must be closed. Indeed, it has even garnered
support for the contrary proposition-that institutions must remain
open-rendering it a neutral, or at least ambiguous, statement on the
historical, and still widespread, reliance by states on institutions to
segregate, isolate, and congregate persons with disabilities.
III. THE DISTORTED APPLICATION OF OLMSTEAD
Seizing on certain statements in the plurality and concurring
opinions in Olmstead, advocates for maintaining institutions have
argued that the integration mandate, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, means that states must afford institutionalized residents, as
well as their guardians and parents, a choice of community placement
or continued residence in their current facility. Therefore, they argue
that states must keep their institutions open to ensure this choice is
meaningful. These arguments have been presented most powerfully
and consistently by the Voice of the Retarded (VOR), whose amicus
brief was cited by the Court for the proposition that the most
integrated setting for some persons with intellectual disabilities is a
segregated institution. Most disturbingly, they have been adopted by
a district court struggling to appease family members of residents of
the oldest intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded
(ICF/MR) in the United States, who opposed the Massachusetts
Governor's decision to close the Fernald Developmental Center.
28
VOR's primary argument attempts to convert the Supreme Court's
respect for individual preference into a right to remain in the facility
of one's choice. Its argument is predicated on two "principles" that
VOR gleans from the Olmstead decision: (1) all placement decisions
must be based upon an individualized assessment, and (2) a transfer
from an institutional setting to the community can only occur if the
person elects to move.29 "Olmstead's requirement of an
28. Ricci v. Okin, 499 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2007).
29. See Ricci v. Patrick, 544 F.3d 8, 15-18 (1st Cir. 2008).
[Vol. 26:3
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TITLE II'S INTEGRATION MANDATE
individualized ISP [individual service plan] process which takes into
account the views of the resident applies equally where the residents
wish to remain in an institution, and the state wishes to transfer them
out."
30
VOR's corollary argument for maintaining institutions converts the
plurality's caution against an ADA mandate for closure into a
prohibition against closing any, some, or at least the institution at
issue in specific litigation. 31 The argument attempts to extend the
Supreme Court's dicta into a federal statutory requirement to
maintain segregated facilities, presumably in order to provide persons
with disabilities with the most integrated setting possible. Moreover,
this argument has been applied defensively in case-specific contexts
where facility phase-down or closure is sought as part of the remedy
to violations of Title II's integration mandate, insisting that the right
to live in an institution equates with the right to remain in the current
institution or the institution of choice.32 It even has been applied
offensively, when institution closure is the result of executive
directives.
33
30. Id. at 22-23. VOR's argument relies upon and distorts lower court decisions in Ligas ex rel.
Foster v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that individualized assessment required
prior to transfer); Capitol People First v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 155 Cal. App. 4th 676, 700
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that placement decision must be based upon individualized assessment);
Black v. Dep't of Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("the antidiscrimination
protections of the ADA are not triggered" by "a medically inappropriate transfer from
institutionalization to community placement"); and Alexander v. Rendell, Civ. No. 05-00419 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 9, 2006) (noting that the ward's guardians would have the final say regarding whether the ward
would be transferred to a community placement or another institutional setting based). However, the
Alexander court's oft-quoted statement was based not on Olmstead or the ADA, but rather on its
interpretation of the terms of a settlement agreement, informed by certain promises and representations
made by the state during the litigation. Id. slip op. at 3-4. Significantly, it did not alter the district court's
earlier ruling that the closing of the Western Center 1CF/MR "serves both the public policy of the ADA,
Rehabilitation Act... and proper judicial deference to the discretion of the state in determining the
manner in which it allocates it resources." Alexander v. Rendell, Civ. No. 05-00419, slip op. at 10 (W.D.
Pa. Jan. 30, 2006).
31. See MASSACHUSETTS COALITION OF FAMILIES AND ADVOCATES FOR THE RETARDED, STOP THE
SHUTDowNs FACTSHEET # 2: OLMSTEAD, http://www.cofar.org/documents/Olmsteadfactsheet.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2010).
32. Rolland v. Patrick, 562 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 2008) (rejecting claim by the guardians of
nursing facility residents who opposed an ADA community integration settlement agreement, claiming
that they had a right to remain in the current institution).
33. Ricci, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
20101
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For instance, when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts elected,
as a matter of state policy and in response to legislative budget
requirements, to close its oldest ICF/MR-the Fernald
Developmental Center-parent plaintiffs sought to enjoin the closure
in a longstanding class action. 34 They claimed that the gubernatorial
mandate deprived them of both an untainted assessment process and
the right to object to community placement. They alleged that these
deprivations contravened their rights under the ADA, as interpreted
in Olmstead. The district court explicitly accepted the first
contention, and implicitly endorsed the second.35  The court
"conclude[d] that the Commonwealth's stated global policy judgment
that Fernald should be closed has damaged the Commonwealth's
ability to adequately assess the needs of the Fernald residents on an
individual, as opposed to a wholesale basis." 36 It explained that
depriving residents and families of the choice to remain at this
specific facility disenfranchises them in the treatment planning
process and denies them their right to object to a proposed transfer. 37
It rejected arguments by the Commonwealth and the Association of
Retarded Citizens of Massachusetts (the Arc) that any order
precluding the closure of Fernald violated, or at least frustrated, the
ADA's integration mandate.38 It determined that the closure
effectively contravened the Supreme Court's requirement that
community placement not be opposed by the resident.39 As a result,
the district court required the Commonwealth to provide every
current Fernald resident with a choice of remaining at this facility, as
34. Id.
35. Id at9O-91.
36. Id. at 91.
37. Id. at 90-91. Ironically, the Commonwealth offered all Fernald residents a choice of transferring
to another large, public ICF/MR or moving to a community placement. Perhaps most tellingly, the
families did not consider this an acceptable choice or one that satisfied their interpretation of the choice
provision of the ADA and its implementing regulations. Id.
38. Id.at92n.16.
39. Ricci v. Okin, 499 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92 n.16 (D. Mass. 2007).
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part of a meaningful and respectful individual service planning
process. 40
This decision was heralded nationally by VOR, its local affiliates,
and numerous other family organizations opposed to facility
41closure. It threatened to translate Title II's prohibition on
segregation into a prohibition on ending segregation. The decision
appeared to enshrine Olmstead's deference to consumer choice into a
proscription on any form of unwanted transfer, effectively creating a
right to remain in the institution of one's choice.
IV. THE PROPERLY CONSTRUED PROMISE AND POTENTIAL OF THE
INTEGRATION MANDATE
A. The Proper Construction of the Integration Mandate in Light of
Olmstead
Properly understood, Olmstead neither requires that an institution
be closed nor mandates that it remain open. There is nothing in
Olmstead that suggests that a state must provide institutionalized care
at the facility of the resident's choosing. Contrary to VOR's
arguments, Olmstead grants no rights to current facility residents
regarding its closure, other than the right to be transferred to a
community placement if medically appropriate and if the state can
reasonably accommodate the placement. Indeed, the integration
mandate is a one-way street. The state is not required to provide
institutional care even if none of the three Olmstead placement
criteria42 is met.43 By its specific terms, the integration mandate
40. The Commonwealth and the Massachusetts Association for Retarded Citizens (Arc) appealed. As
more fully discussed below in Part V, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this injunction. Ricci
v. Patrick, 544 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1907 (2009).
41. See Massachusetts Coalition of Families and Advocates for the Retarded,
www.cofar.org/whattoget.aspx?getme=court (last visited June 26, 2009); Avert Rolland Tragedy,
www.avertroltandtragedy.org (last visited June 26, 2009).
42. Justice Ginsburg concluded that if the individual can "handle and benefit" from community
placement, if the placement is not opposed by the person with disability, and the state can reasonably
accommodate the request, the ADA requires that the state offer the individual an integrated placement.
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
43. Richard C. v. Houstoun, 196 F.R.D. 288, 292 (W.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd sub. nom, Richard C. v.
Snider, 229 F.3d 1139 (Table) (3d Cir. 2000).
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requires movement from more to less restrictive settings, not the
reverse. 44 As one court recently held:
Congress, in enacting the ADA, and the Attorney General, in
issuing regulations interpreting the ADA have made the
judgment that mentally retarded individuals should live in the
most integrated setting that is appropriate to their needs. The
court must do what it can to give effect to this statutory
preference for integration, while keeping in mind that it must
defer to the judgment of the defendants' medical and mental
health professionals in determining whether community
placement is appropriate for individual class members.45
Title II, as interpreted in Olmstead, certainly provides no right to
interfere with a state's decision to close an antiquated, costly, and
underutilized institution. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, "The
state reserves the right to unilaterally close a state school [for the
mentally retarded] for administrative or financial reasons, even if it
means that certain residents will have to relocate as a result.'A6 And
as the Supreme Court has stated clearly, "[F]ederal law (Title XIX)
'does not confer a right to continued residence in the home of one's
choice."A7
Rather, Olmstead's relevance to institution closure flows from the
consequences of the state's duty to provide treatment in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual and its
directive that states must allocate their resources in a fair and
44. See Richard C., 196 F.R.D. at 291-92.
45. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 (D. Conn. 2008).
46. Baccus v. Parrish, 45 F.3d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Alexander v. Rendell, No. 05-419J,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3378, at *18-19 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2006) ("The Court concludes that the
Defendants' closing of the Altoona Center and its plan for transfer of its residents serves both the public
policy of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act and the applicable Medicaid statutes and proper judicial
deference to the discretion of the state in determining the manner in which it allocates its
resources.... "); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 783 F. Supp. 286, 298 (N.D. Tex. 1991), affig 983 F.2d 1061 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993), reh'g denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993) ("The State has
always possessed the power and frequently exercises the power--to relocate its residents for its own
administrative needs. If it is so desired, the State could unilaterally close any of the state [ICF/MRs] for
economic reasons or otherwise.").
47. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 785 (1980).
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equitable manner to meet the needs of all eligible individuals. For
most states that serve many more persons than they confine in their
institutions, phasing down some of their extraordinarily expensive
facilities that serve only a few hundred persons is a necessary and
appropriate action to comply with the ADA.
The fact that states are not required to close institutions certainly
does not mean that they have to maintain them. In order to comply
with their duty under the ADA to eliminate unnecessary segregation,
states are afforded considerable flexibility to manage their resources,
to develop, maintain, or modify their programs, and to transfer
institutionalized residents to the community at a reasonable pace,
pursuant to an effectively working plan.48 This flexibility must
encompass the ability to transfer resources, as well as residents, and
to close outdated or expensive facilities in order to serve the greatest
number of needy citizens in an equitable and efficient manner.
Phasing down and closing large institutions is certainly an important
option that states have, and historically, has been used effectively to
implement their federal statutory duty to eliminate the segregation of
persons with disabilities. Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically
recognized that one of the means of financing an increase in
community care would be through savings achieved by closing
49institutions.
4
This equilibrium between promoting but not requiring closure
provided the foundation for the First Circuit's reversal of the district
court's injunction in Ricci. The court first summarized the
background of the appeal, noting that in 2003 the Commonwealth
48. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,605-06 (1999).
49. Id. at 604 & n. 15. That this is the fundamental import of the Olmstead ruling is confirmed by a
January 14, 2000 letter from the Department of Health and Human Services to all State Medicaid
Directors stating that "[t]he Court's decision [in Olmstead] clearly challenges us to develop more
opportunities for individuals with disabilities through more accessible systems of cost-effective
community-based services." Letter from Timothy Westmoreland and Thomas Perez to State Medicaid
Directors (Jan. 14, 2000), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/add/otherpublications/
olmstead.html. Because resources are limited, any increase in community-based resources will
necessitate a decrease in institutional resources. The Court recognized as much, noting that part of the
cost of the transition from institutional to community-based care may be "increased overall expenses"
due to the inability to immediately "take advantage of the savings associated with the closure of
institutions." Id. at 604 & n. 15 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae).
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announced its intention to close the Femald Developmental Center,
as well as its five other state-operated ICFs/MR.50 This executive
decision was reinforced by legislative directives "to promote
compliance with a Supreme Court decision, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring,... [which] emphasized the congressional intent in Title
II of the ... [ADA] to avoid discrimination against mentally disabled
persons by promoting their placement into community settings." 51 It
was also supported by the challenge to equitably and efficiently
allocate it resources, since the per-resident cost at Fernald was over
250% higher than community residential services and approximately
150% higher than the other ICFs/MR.52
Although the court of appeals reversed the district court's
injunction on jurisdictional grounds,53 and did not reach the question
of whether the injunction could or did prohibit the closure of the
institution, it took the opportunity to note that an executive decision
to close an institution was consistent with Olmstead.54 It found that
"the law has moved in a direction disfavoring institutionalization." 55
The court noted and implicitly rejected VOR's arguments that the
individualized assessment and choice principles contained in
Olmstead prohibited involuntary transfers that might be necessary to
accomplish institutional closure.56 Moreover, and perhaps most
significantly, it noted that the individualized assessment and service
50. Ricci v. Patrick, 544 F.3d 8, 12-16 (1st Cir. 2008).
51. Id. at 12. The Court also noted:
Another stated purpose was to further the Commonwealth's own established policy of
reducing its institutional capacity and of providing services to patients in less restrictive
settings. This policy decision was grounded in evidence of prior successful transitions of
a number of mentally retarded residents from residential settings, from the past closing of
other ICFs. Further, the Commonwealth was cognizant of national trends toward
deinstitutionalization and the need for certainty in planning matters such as personnel
placement. The legislature required DMR to reduce capacity at these ICFs, provided that
equal or better services for residents could be furnished in community settings.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 17.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id.
56. Ricci, 544 F.3d at 21 & n. 11. The Court noted the dispute between VOR and the Arc concerning
the meaning of Olmstead and national trends. Although it allegedly declined to address this dispute, it
clearly endorsed and found support in Olmstead for preferring "community placement of
institutionalized individuals." Id.
[Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 868 2009-2010
868   I    l. :  
 rn  t l  
t  l  50  
 i  i s   
 t   . . i. 
i ring, .     
.   
 t  i s.,,51  
   tl  
 t   
 r ity ti l t l  
 l  52 
  t's 
i j ti   j i i ti l s,53   
 i     
i tit ti ,     ti   
l stead. 54  
t  l  s e  in a direction disfavoring institutionalization.,,55 
 t t     '  t   
i i i li  t   i l s i   
  r   
 56 r,  
i i i tl , it   lized t   
d. 
t  
. I . t .  t   
t r t t    t    lt ' f 
i  it     
tti . i  li  i i    i     
 f 
t  .  i t  
i tit ti li ti   t    t i t  i    
l t.  l i l t     r  
l   it   
. J . 
. .  
. . 
. . 
. i i,  .     .ll.  i  
t e ea i  f l ste   ti l tr s. lt  it ll l  li  t     
clearly endorsed and f  s rt i  l ste  f r r f rri  it  l t  
i tit ti li  i ls." . 
14
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/11
TITLE U'S INTEGRATION MANDATE
planning process endorsed by the Supreme Court in Olmstead "does
not guarantee any class member any particular residential placement,
nor does it guarantee that Fernald be maintained open so long as any
particular resident prefers to remain there." 57 The court concluded,
"the removal of one of several available residential
facilities.., cannot itself result in there being a violation of the
[service planning] process.', 58 In overturning the lower court's
injunction, the First Circuit determined that states have broad
discretion and may have sound reasons to close segregated
institutions, that doing so furthered Title II's integration mandate, and
that Olmstead created no obstacles to, and in fact supported, facility
closure.
B. Promoting State Policies That Favor Closure
Like the executive and legislative directives cited by the First
Circuit in Ricci, many states have statutes, executive orders,
regulations, and policies that at least favor community integration and
occasionally mandate facility phase-down. These state requirements
also may be incorporated in some states' Olmstead plans, but more
commonly are the actions of governors, agency directors, or
legislators seeking to consolidate excess bed capacity, reduce
excessive per diem institutional costs, avoid compliance with
demanding federal facility regulations and certifications, establish
service planning processes, and promote family and community
values. These state decisions influence and embolden other states.
59
They can be justified as necessary to comply with, and even
compelled by, the ADA's integration mandate. They are clearly
designed to facilitate the goals of the ADA, to respect the
Congressional findings that animate the ADA, and to allow states to
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id. The Court further went on to find that "the very nature of [that] process itself contradicts the
district court's conclusion. As the Commonwealth notes, the... process focuses only on the services a
resident is to receive; [it] does not specify where those services are to be delivered." Id.
59. The Ricci court found it instructive that the neighboring states of Maine, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island "ha[d] moved away from institutionalization completely" and closed all of their segregated
institutions for persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. Ricci, 544 F.3d at 21.
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accommodate persons with disabilities, as required by the ADA.
Governors, state agency directors, and legislative leaders can be
persuaded, and have been, to issue directives to close antiquated
institutions, consolidate facility capacity, and reallocate resources to
expand community supports.
States have developed successful strategies to address obstacles to
closure. Governors, particularly those from Northeastern and
Midwestern States where there are a disproportionate number of
segregated institutions and powerful state employee unions, have
established commissions, modeled after the federal military base
closing commission, with the authority to determine which facilities
to shutter. Alternatively, these bodies are authorized to recommend a
phase-down schedule for segregated settings, with the goal of
reducing capacity in existing institutions and eventually consolidating
space, workers, and residents into fewer facilities, while
simultaneously allowing skeptical families to choose a transfer to one
of the remaining facilities. Some states, like Rhode Island and
Massachusetts, have developed state-operated community residences
that are staffed with state employees, thereby allowing institutional
staff to have some job security and families to feel that new programs
are as secure and reliable as a former facility.
In current economic times, states may be particularly interested in
consolidating, phasing-down, and closing large, segregated
institutions, simply to achieve needed cost-savings. While there are
no specific incentives for promoting community integration in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the enhanced federal
reimbursement (FFP) percentage offers additional federal revenue to
support community services provided through State Plans, Early
Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment programs, Home and
Community-Based Service Waivers, and 1115 Demonstration
Projects to Medicaid-eligible individuals. These Medicaid provisions
cover a broad array of supports that may be needed by persons
institutionalized in ICFs/MR, psychiatric hospitals, nursing facilities,
juvenile justice facilities, and other institutions that confine persons
with disabilities. Thus, state decisions to close segregated institutions
[Vol 26:3
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can be promoted as economically necessary as well as consistent with
federal law.
It seems reasonably clear that these public policy decisions will be
endorsed by the federal courts, either as strategy to comply with Title
II's integration mandate or at least as an expression of federalism and
deference to state officials. Courts will look sympathetically at the
cost considerations that justify closure, and the reallocation of
institutional resources to support community services. While the
lower courts will adhere to the Supreme Court's criteria for
individual placement decisions, they are not likely to adopt VOR's
arguments that individualized assessment and family/resident
preference create obstacles to closure or are even relevant in the face
of a decision to shutter an existing institution.
C. Advocating for Incrementalism: Individualized Assessments for
Community Placement That Produce Facility Phase-down, and
Eventual Closure
Even if invoking Title II as a mandate for closure is unpersuasive,
relying on it to achieve incremental phase-down and eventual closure
is a pragmatic and proven strategy. States must accommodate
residents of institutions who can live safely in the community with
available supports. Many current residents of many existing
institutions can be adequately served through available state
programs, at least if those programs are expanded. Enforcing the
integration mandate for these individuals through Olmstead claims
will undoubtedly result in a significant reduction in the census of
many facilities, eventually raising questions about under-utilization,
over-capacity, excessive cost, and equitable treatment of similarly-
situated individuals. It is well established that these factors generate
discussions about closure, whether as part of the Olmstead remedy or
as a discrete policy decision by state officials.60 It is also well
60. It is just this pattern that led to Massachusetts's decision to close the Belchertown and Dever
Developmental Centers which the First Circuit pointed to as a reasonable justification for its subsequent
decision to close the Fernald Developmental Center. Ricci, 544 F.3d at 18. And it is the appeals court's
decision that led to the subsequent announcement by the Massachusetts Secretary of Health and Human
Services that the Commonwealth would close five additional institutions over the next several years. See
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documented that an incremental phase-down of large, segregated
institutions predictably leads to closure in at least a significant
number of cases.61  While Title II may not mandate closure,
aggressive and persistent enforcement of the integration mandate will
most certainly produce this result.
62
D. Closure As a Remedy to Unremedied Institutional Conditions
Before the enactment of the ADA, class action cases frequently
sought both improvement in institutional conditions to satisfy the
constitutional standards for confinement, as well as community
placement, pursuant to either § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the
constitutional command to provide treatment in the least restrictive
alternative. Where courts found unconstitutional conditions, they
frequently ordered sweeping remedial orders. 63 Equally as frequently,
states failed to comply with these remedial orders in a timely fashion.
As a result, several courts eventually abandoned their efforts to
improve conditions of confinement and ordered the institutions
Elin Howe, Update 161, State Announces More Community Living Options for People with
Developmental Disabilities (Dec. 12, 2008), www.mass.gov (search "update 161"; then follow
"12/12/08 - Update #161" hyperlink).
61. DAVID BRADDOCK, THE STATE OF THE STATES 50-53, tbl. 14 (2008).
62. There is a direct correlation between those states, counties, and regions that are institution free, at
least for persons with developmental disabilities and occasionally for persons with psychiatric
disabilities, and those that were the object of federal class action cases seeking community placement as
the primary remedy. See Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (central Florida); Brewster
v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488 (1st Cir. 1993) (western Massachusetts); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. &
Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1231 (D.N.M. 1990) (New Mexico); Wuori v. Concannon, 551 F. Supp. 185
(D. Me. 1982) (Maine); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981) (New Hampshire); Michigan
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Smith, 475 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (Michigan), aft'gjudgment,
657 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1981); Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978) (District of
Columbia); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) (Minnesota), supplementing opinion,
68 F.R.D. 589 (D. Minn. 1975), aftig judgment, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975). Rhode Island, Indiana,
Pennsylvania, and Florida were the subject of cases that resulted in unreported consent decrees having
the same effect. For a compendium of recent cases, see HUMAN SERVICES RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
STATUS REPORT: LITIGATION CONCERNING HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES (2007), available at http://www.hsri.org/docs/litigation052307.pdf.
63. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Fort Stanton, 757 F. Supp. 1231
(D.N.M. 1990); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'din
part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev"g judgment, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), remanded to 673
F.2d 647 (3d. Cir. 1982), rev"g judgment, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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TITLE II'S INTEGRATION MANDATE
closed.64 Alternatively, state officials simply gave up trying to
remedy these violations, resulting in the gradual placement of all
remaining residents and the eventual closure of the institution.
65
While more recent cases have themselves abandoned institutional
improvement strategies in favor of "pure" ADA claims, it is clear that
aggressive and persistent enforcement of rigorous institutional
requirements can itself be a catalyst for closure. For instance,
insisting that states fully comply with the active treatment
requirements for nursing facility residents with disabilities can result
in a dramatic increase in community placements and the phase-down
or closure of even private facilities.
66
CONCLUSION
Although facially neutral on the issue of closure, Title II's
integration mandate still holds considerable promise for closing
segregated facilities, mostly through pragmatic incrementalism rather
than judicial mandates. But this incrementalism is not self-generating
and certainly not self-sustaining. To the contrary, a host of outcries,
resistance, and obstacles-including reliance on the Supreme Court's
language in Olmstead-will arise to oppose the closing of institutions
that have been a familiar part of the service system landscape for over
a century. Civil rights advocates must passionately insist on the full
realization of the promise of the ADA. They must creatively generate
arguments, grounded in equity, efficiency, and legal rights, that result
in institutional phase-down, consolidation, and closure. Advocates
must also patiently pursue, through Olmstead claims, the full
enforcement of those rights, so that they can bear witness to the
incremental end of segregation.
67
64. Halderman, 446 F. Supp. 1295.
65. Jackson, 757 F. Supp. 1243; Rockefeller, 375 F. Supp. 752.
66. Rolland v. Patrick, 562 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 2008).
67. A powerful and moving requiem, titled Habeas Corpus, was held on November 18, 2000 at the
former Northampton State Hospital, which once confined over 2,500 persons with psychiatric
disabilities and eventually closed in 1992, as a result of the aggressive enforcement of the Consent
Decree in Brewster. The requiem, staged by Anna Schuleit, poured J.S. Bach's Magnificat through the
open windows of the now-deserted hospital. The music followed a morning of compelling memories
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spoken by former residents and memorialized a European village tradition that requires that windows be
opened to let the suffering out. For more information, see Anna Schuleit, Habeas Corpus (2000),
http://www. 1856.org/anna/habeas.html.
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